Pretending to be (un)able

By Ditmir BUSHATI

The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, also Vice-President of the European Commission, Kaja Kallas, when asked by journalists at the press conference in Tirana about the possibility of Albania's membership in the EU in 2030, emphasized that: "it is a realistic objective, but in order to achieve it, several steps must be taken, and Albania must adopt and implement reforms in practice."

On her first visit to Albania, as part of a regional trip, Kaja Kallas kindly reminded us of two of the most basic aspects of the enlargement process.

First, this process has three actors: the EU member states (decision makers); the European Commission (the driving force of the European integration process and at the same time the closest friend of the candidate country); the candidate country aiming for membership (Albania).

Second, reforms can only be accomplished by creating an inclusive political climate.

It is worth recalling that, in the process of Albania's accession to NATO, in addition to geopolitical circumstances, political understanding for the adoption and implementation of reforms in the field of security and the rule of law were crucial. In the context of EU membership, this takes on even greater value, since unlike NATO membership, this process has a direct impact on almost all areas of life.

EU membership is a national objective that extends beyond political parties. Even more so in the conditions of Albania where the connection with Europe has been and remains organic. Europe is a kind of spiritual hearth of Albanians from Balshaj onwards. Or as Ismail Kadare said: “our natural state”.

Kaja Kallas should be appreciated for the authenticity with which she conveyed the messages, which is not always a distinctive feature for Brussels officials, by not feeding false illusions, which the Albanian people do not need. I recall here the European officials who, immediately after the publication of the 2018 Enlargement Strategy, set 2025 as a possible deadline for the membership of Montenegro and Serbia. Such sweet-talking predictions without effects in practice do not need further elaboration.

For geopolitical reasons, particularly related to the war in Ukraine, EU enlargement has returned to the political agenda. However, the materialization of this process is not a closed issue, as the EU also faces countless difficulties in the administration of internal affairs. Therefore, Kaja Kallas rightly referred to the steps that need to be taken in this process, meaning first the EU member states. On the other hand, we must understand that member states will not accept new memberships solely for geopolitical reasons, ignoring the fulfillment of rule of law and good governance reforms.

IF THEY DON'T MAKE IT THERE THEY DON'T MAKE IT ANYWHERE

Although it has been more than two years since EU member states have asked the European Commission to draft a document on reforming the EU in light of the enlargement process, they are not yet ready for this discussion, nor for the final EU project.

Not all EU member states share the same ideas about how the EU should become a functional organization to enable the membership of several candidate countries, including our country, in the new geopolitical context where it needs to act as an important global actor, alongside the US, China, Russia and India.

The examples of France and Germany, traditionally considered the driving force of the EU, are the best reflection of this reality. Thus, a few weeks after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, French President Emmanuel Macron presented his vision for the creation of the European Political Community, with the conviction that, “the EU cannot remain the only platform to structure the European continent.” This was an idea recycled by former French President Francois Mitterrand, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, who aimed to avoid a massive and rapid expansion of the EU with states that had just emerged from the communist yoke.

In both cases, France's concern is essentially about avoiding the enlargement process. For this reason, the European Political Community attempts to create "strategic intimacy" (intimité stratégique) between European states in the face of Russian aggression. But, in fact, it is limited to a dialogue platform, where states can discuss things together, even if they do not share common values ​​and goals, far from being a European forum where decisions are made.

On the other hand, the outgoing German government's program pledged to 'accelerate' the process of accession of the Western Balkan countries to the EU. Four years later, it is impossible to consider this commitment fulfilled. While in the agreement for the future governing coalition between the CDU/CSU and the German Social Democrats, enlargement is considered 'a geopolitical necessity' and the approach of 'gradual integration' is supported, but there is no commitment accompanied by deadlines for the completion of the negotiation process and the admission of new states. In the text of the agreement, the consolidation of the EU through its reform is defined as a prerequisite for any possible enlargement.

Not all EU member states are willing to contribute financially or forgo financial benefits in a larger EU. For this reason, the report drafted by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, “On the Future of the EU Internal Market”, proposes a solidarity mechanism for enlargement, which would alleviate the fears of countries that are net beneficiaries of a possible membership of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova.

Not all EU member states agree on whether countries that are occupied or in a state of unresolved conflict can become part of the EU. Not all EU member states are willing to sacrifice social welfare packages and spend more on security.

It is worth noting that in the much-discussed report by former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, “On the Future of Europe’s Competitiveness”, the Western Balkans are not mentioned at all in terms of the enlargement process. In fact, the word ‘enlargement’ is used in the past tense and not in the future. The value of eight hundred billion euros through which Draghi thinks Europe will become competitive is very large compared to the value of six billion euros that the EU offers for the Western Balkans through the Growth Plan, which does not mitigate the development gap between the EU and the countries of the region.

This year, work begins on the EU's multiannual budget, which is also an indicator of political readiness for enlargement. It remains to be seen whether this budget will harmonize Draghi and Letta's proposals for EU countries and those aiming for membership.

Despite the new geopolitical context we are living in and the above proposals, it must be acknowledged that the 'enlargement engine' with motivating effects on candidate countries continues to be off. EU member states hold the key to turning on the 'enlargement engine', just as candidate countries hold the key to using the 'conditionality' in this process as an opportunity to change and reform the quality of governance and life.

The lyrics of the famous song “New York, New York” state, among other things: “if I can make it there, I can make it anywhere.” The opposite is true in the case of enlargement, where EU member states must understand that “if they can’t make it there (enlarge with the Western Balkans), they can’t make it anywhere.”

The sooner consensus is reached on this, the easier it will be for the European Commission. In the absence of a green light from EU member states for this process, the European Commission has been creative in keeping it alive. However, this is not enough to influence the democratic transformation and economic and social development of the candidate countries.

TRUTH IS THE BEST WAY FORWARD

Is 2030 an achievable target for Albania's EU membership? This question brings to mind May 1, 2004, when we were organizing a debate on this topic in the hall of the Academy of Arts in Tirana, together with the ambassadors of the countries that had just been admitted to the EU. To the interest from the hall about 'when will Albania be admitted to the EU', we responded with some optimism: 'maybe within a decade', disappointing the expectations of the participants in the debate, for whom a decade seemed more like a horizon than a tangible objective.

Likewise, on June 12, 2006, when Albania signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement, which to this day remains the main contract between Albania and the EU, when asked by a national television station when Albania would join the EU, I replied: "if everything is implemented according to the provisions of the agreement, within a decade."

Indeed, our path towards the EU, since 1990, resembles a steep path, which does not justify the enthusiasm and popular support for this process. It is related to the process of democratic state consolidation, which reflects the weaknesses of our democratic tradition, the difficulty of cultivating the best European values ​​of the rule of law, excessive polarization and the unilateral destruction of the rules of the political game.

We missed a chance on our path to the EU, which seemed brisk in the early 1990s and several in the early 2000s. We sat at the table for more than three years to sign the SAA, it took us five years to obtain candidate status and thirteen years to start EU membership talks.

The same can be said for the absorption of EU funds in the form of grants, where Albania ranks second to last, leaving behind only Bosnia and Herzegovina. Or of European investments in the form of loans and grants, where we are on the same level as North Macedonia and leaving behind Montenegro and Kosovo.

We have lost a lot of time along the way. And in most cases we have hindered ourselves in this process. The above history is not simply a lesson from the past, but the key to facing the challenges of the present and predicting the future. Viewed in this context, setting a timeframe within which we aim for EU membership, if not accompanied by a more inclusive and unifying platform that promotes a different quality and speed for democratic state consolidation reforms and the absorption of EU funds, is at best pretending to be (impossible). / The analysis is a publication of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Tirana Foundation (A2 Televizion)