Written by: Elez Biberaj
Speech at the conference on Kosovo's relations with the United States, held at George Washington University, February 18, 2025
The United States and Kosovo have had a multifaceted and very special relationship. Like any bilateral, asymmetrical relationship, this relationship has gone through different phases, experiencing significant transformations – from periods of intense interactions, convergence of interests, and a high level of cooperation and policy coordination, to a more complex relationship, which has sometimes been characterized by disagreements on fundamental issues.
The United States has been the driving force behind Kosovo's liberation, declaration of independence, and consolidation of statehood.
Successive American administrations, both Republican and Democratic, have pursued a consistent policy toward Kosovo. America's vision for Kosovo has been a stable, prosperous, and democratic country, with strong independent institutions, good governance, respect for the rule of law, respect for minority rights, and good relations with neighbors.
For decades, the United States has been steadfastly committed to helping Kosovo address its internal and external challenges, fostering its stability and democratization and providing significant diplomatic, political, economic, and military support. The United States played a direct and leading role in securing Kosovo’s international standing. U.S. public diplomacy efforts on behalf of Kosovo were instrumental in securing recognition from more than 100 countries. The United States also played a key role in defending Kosovo’s case at the International Court of Justice, which ruled that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law. Kosovo enjoyed broad bipartisan support and was the focus of high-level attention. Kosovo leaders and officials enjoyed unusual access to key U.S. policymakers. In recent decades, the United States has provided nearly $2 billion in assistance. A contingent of U.S. troops is part of KFOR, which protects Kosovo’s security.
Nga ana e saj, Kosova ka qenë një aleat i vendosur amerikan, një partner i rëndësishëm në Ballkan dhe një mbështetës i veprimeve të politikës së jashtme amerikane. Ajo ka ndarë objektivat amerikane për të kundërshtuar ndikimin rus dhe kinez dhe përpjekjet e tyre destabilizuese në rajon. Me kërkesën e Uashingtonit, ajo ka pranuar edhe refugjatët afganë. Kosova është padyshim vendi më pro-amerikan në Evropë. Shumë shqiptarë kanë arritur ne përfundim se marrëdhënien me Shtetet e Bashkuara janë të përhershme dhe vendimtare për mirëqenien e Kosovës.
Falë mbështetjes së Amerikës, Kosova është një histori suksesi. Ajo ka bërë përparim të ndjeshëm në konsolidimin e shtetit të saj, ka një rend demokratik funksionues, një ekonomi tregu dhe marrëdhënie të mira me të gjithë fqinjët e saj, me përjashtim të Serbisë. Kosova nuk ndryshon në mënyrë të konsiderueshme nga fqinjët e saj sa i përket qeverisjes, sundimit të ligjit, institucioneve të pavarura, mbrojtjes së pakicave, respektimit të të drejtave të njeriut, lirive të shtypit dhe mbajtjes së zgjedhjeve të rregullta.
Përkundër këtij përparimi, Kosova është në fazë kalimtare. Sfida më e madhe e saj është kërcënimi nga Serbia. Njëzet e pesë vjet pas përfundimit të luftës së vitit 1999, Beogradi vazhdon të minojë sovranitetin e Kosovës, duke mbështetur strukturat paralele në veri, duke nxitur incidente të dhunshme dhe duke punuar kundër anëtarësimit të Kosovës në institucionet ndërkombëtare.
Ndërsa bota ka ecur përpara, shqiptarët dhe serbët mbeten peng i së kaluarës së tyre të trazuar. Ata ende e shohin marrëdhënien e tyre si çdo fitore për njëren pale është humbje për palen tjetër. Me vizionet konkurruese të marrëdhënies së tyre, të dy palët nuk kanë arritur të marrin përgjegjësinë dhe të çojnë përpara procesin e pajtimit. Ndërsa Kosova kërkon njohjen nga Beogradi, Serbia përpiqet për një ndarje de facto dhe deri tani ka kundërshtuar çdo zgjjidhje që do të forconte sovranitetin e Kosovës.
SHBA dhe BE kanë punuar ngushtë për të lehtësuar një dialog midis Prishtinës dhe Beogradit, duke trajtuar një sërë çështjesh me shpresën se në fund të procesit do të kishte një pajtim dhe Serbia do ta njihte Kosovën. Bisedimet e lehtësuara nga BE çuan në nënshkrimin e një sërë marrëveshjesh në 2013 dhe 2015, duke parashikuar integrimin e autoriteteve policore dhe gjyqësore në veri në sistemin e Kosovës, reciprocitetin e targave dhe, më e diskutuara, krijimin e një asociacioni të komunave me shumicë serbe.
While some of the agreements were implemented, the agreement calling for an association of Serb-majority municipalities caused major disagreements. Almost immediately, Belgrade and Pristina offered different interpretations of the agreement. Belgrade insisted that the association should have executive powers – a red line for all major political forces in Kosovo. Many Albanians believed that the agreement was flawed and that the dialogue process was essentially an attempt to renegotiate independence. In their view, the US and EU were forcing Pristina to make concessions while failing to exert sufficient pressure on President Aleksandar Vučić to recognize Kosovo.
The establishment of the Specialist Chambers in The Hague was also a highly polarizing issue. Albanians saw the establishment of the Specialist Court as an attack on Kosovo’s sovereignty and an attempt to equate Serbian crimes with Albanian crimes. The indictment of President Hashim Thaçi in June 2020, while he was en route to the White House for a meeting with President Trump and President Vučić, was seen by both his supporters and opponents as a deeply humiliating event.
The Kosovo government faced increasing challenges in balancing the priority of extending its authority to the north with calls to accept Serbian demands that clearly aimed to diminish Kosovo’s sovereignty. Pristina’s leaders were unable to propose a credible alternative to the association agreement or to develop a coherent policy towards the Serbian minority. Meanwhile, they faced the uneasy situation in which the US, their main ally, was gradually but surely changing its policies and, in their view, increasingly siding with Serbia. Many Albanians could not understand how Washington did not show support for Pristina’s position and how the Western powers, which had undertaken the military campaign that liberated Kosovo, did not see Serbia through their prism. But the US and its European allies had never seen Serbia through the prism of Kosovo, and their stance on Kosovo was now part of a broader, regional context. President Vučić had been rehabilitated – only Albanians remembered his ties to the Milošević regime – and was now seen as an important actor on various issues.
Despite emerging disagreements and moments of tension over the stalled talks with Serbia, Pristina worked closely with Washington. Senior leaders, such as Presidents Thaçi, Fatmir Sejdiu, Atifete Jahjaga, and Prime Ministers Isa Mustafaj, Ramush Haradinaj, and Avdullah Hoti, supported the image of strong ties, and cooperation continued to expand in all areas.
After his election as president, Hashim Thaçi decided that he, instead of the prime minister, as had been the practice until then, would lead the talks with Serbia. This became a highly personalized negotiation process, and other local actors were sidelined. After a series of meetings with Vučić, in the summer of 2018 Thaçi proposed what he called a “border correction” with Serbia. His plan sparked internal divisions, and serious differences emerged between Thaçi and Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj, who denounced the president as a heavy-handed digger of Kosovo’s independence. The dialogue with Serbia was interrupted in December 2018, when Haradinaj imposed 100% tariffs on goods from Serbia.
Kosovo’s strong and comprehensive relationship with the United States was severely tested with the rise to power of Prime Minister Albin Kurti. Kurti scored an impressive victory in the 2021 elections, securing 58 of the 120 seats in parliament. He had a stronger mandate than any other leader since independence to make difficult decisions in advancing the reconciliation process with Serbia.
From the beginning, Kurti made it clear that dialogue was not at the top of his agenda. He reluctantly participated in talks with Serbia, but little progress was made. In March 2023, Kurti and Vučić agreed to an EU-brokered deal, known as the Ohrid Agreement, aimed at fully normalizing relations. The Ohrid Agreement provides a roadmap for implementing previous agreements, provides for a level of self-government for the Serb minority, and mutual recognition of state symbols. The agreement does not require Belgrade to recognize Kosovo, but it prevents Serbia from blocking Kosovo’s membership in international organizations. While Vučić verbally accepted the agreement, he refused to sign it. Prime Minister Ana Brnabić later sent a letter to Brussels, stating that Serbia could not implement parts of the agreement that implied Belgrade’s de facto recognition of Kosovo.
The EU insisted that the agreement was binding and urged both sides to implement it. Kurti expressed readiness to sign the agreement, but he insisted that Kosovo would not proceed with implementation unless Vučić also signed the agreement and withdrew Brnabić's letter.
Meanwhile, the situation in the north deteriorated, with a series of violent incidents. Serb members of parliament, mayors, judges, prosecutors, and police officers resigned. Kurti responded by taking steps to integrate the north into the country’s legal and administrative system. He dismantled parallel institutions, closed Serbian banks, mandated the use of the EURO currency, and increased the presence of special security forces. Kurti used nationalist rhetoric and claimed that his measures had led to the extension of Kosovo’s sovereignty. His actions were popular and welcomed by his supporters and the population at large, but they dealt a strategic blow to Kosovo.
Despite repeated requests from US and EU officials to coordinate such controversial actions in the north, Kurti failed to show sensitivity towards the US, thus seriously damaging relations with Kosovo’s most important strategic ally. Both the US and the EU imposed punitive measures against Kosovo.
Ironically, Kurti’s term coincided with that of Joe Biden. President Biden was well-versed in Albanian-Serbian issues and, as a senator and vice president, was one of Kosovo’s strongest supporters. Senior members of his administration had played important roles during the 1999 war and were considered friends of Kosovo. Instead of taking advantage of these personal relationships and access to most senior policymakers, Kurti managed to alienate some of Kosovo’s most ardent American supporters.
Kurti made no serious effort to protect and build Kosovo’s most important relationship. He downplayed the punitive measures imposed on his country and maintained the illusion that the relationship with the United States was intact. He also made no visible public diplomacy efforts to explain his government’s position or to offer a credible alternative that might have been acceptable to Washington. While public diplomacy efforts in themselves could not have secured a favorable solution for Pristina, they could have contributed to broadening relations and a better understanding of the factors that underpinned Kosovo’s policies.
This was in contrast to the approach taken in the past by Kosovo leaders. In the 1990s, Ibrahim Rugova engaged in an extensive public campaign in the United States, explaining Kosovo’s positions and making efforts to secure support and strengthen ties. He succeeded in building valuable relationships and securing support for Kosovo’s position. President Rugova also engaged the small but influential Albanian-American community, which played a major role in raising public awareness and securing American support. Albanian-Americans used a variety of tactics and media to influence key American policymakers—in the White House, the National Security Council, and the State Department. Community activists also provided significant support in Congress. Powerful lawmakers, such as Representative Tom Lantos, Senator Dennis DeConcini, Senator Bob Dole, Senator Joe Biden, Representative Eliott Engel, and others, became strong supporters of Kosovo. After liberation, Rugova and other Kosovar leaders creatively continued their efforts to expand support for Kosovo in the American political and media arena.
Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered a significant shift in US foreign policy objectives in the Balkans. The Biden administration focused on engaging Serbia in the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Although Serbia under President Vučić had consistently undermined the negotiation process with Kosovo, US attitudes toward Serbia shifted in ways that undermined Kosovo’s position. Moderating Serbia’s aggressive stance toward Kosovo took second place to efforts to persuade Belgrade to change its pro-Russian stance.
The general opinion is that Kurti mismanaged relations with the United States and perhaps squandered the best opportunity he had during his time as prime minister to significantly advance his country’s interests. While his actions damaged Kosovo’s special relationship with the United States, they do not appear to have measurably improved Kosovo’s position. Pristina’s authority in the north remains weak, and the integration of Serbs may have become even more difficult.
Today, the US-Kosovo relationship is at an important turning point. The new Trump administration and the recent elections in Kosovo present both challenges and opportunities to put US-Kosovo relations back on track.
Kosovo faces a new geopolitical situation, which is not necessarily in its favor. President Trump’s approach to foreign policy is transactional. He has brought about profound changes in the course of American policy. The improvement in relations between the United States and Russia, the coercive diplomacy being exercised towards Ukraine to make concessions to Moscow, and other shifts in American strategy signal a departure from Washington’s previous agenda of promoting democracy, countering Russian influence in the Balkans, and challenging rising authoritarianism in the region.
The Trump administration has yet to formulate a clear strategy for the Balkans, and it remains to be seen whether Kosovo will be at the center of the administration's attention. President Trump's message to President Vjosa Osmani, on the occasion of Kosovo's Independence Day, was a positive one. He expressed full support for Kosovo and said that the United States "looks forward to building a more productive relationship with the government of Kosovo over the coming year."
But Kosovo remains highly vulnerable to changing US policy and the new geopolitical landscape. Serbia is already feeling emboldened by President Trump’s return to the White House. In a speech at a rally in Mitrovica, Srem, on the occasion of Serbia’s Statehood Day on February 15, Vučić struck an aggressive tone. He declared that Kosovo was “part of our territory” and claimed that the three-month student protests were instigated by foreigners because he refused to “capitulate” on the Kosovo issue. He specifically denounced USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy for allegedly orchestrating a “color revolution” aimed at his ouster from power. Vučić may try to use the Kosovo issue to divert attention from the growing internal unrest through provocative incidents in the north and by insisting on his demands for a Dayton-style agreement. Kosovo lacks the capacity to protect its own security and can no longer take for granted that KFOR would protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Kosovo’s recent elections, however, offer an opportunity. The new situation requires a mature leadership that is able to take concrete and sustained action to restore Kosovo’s tarnished relations with the United States and to seek Washington’s help in reaching an agreement with Serbia that strengthens its sovereignty. This necessitates the rapid formation of a new government. Regardless of who forms the next government, Kurti or the opposition forces, Kosovo needs a cross-party agreement to develop a coherent policy. It also needs to appoint to key cabinet positions pragmatic, weighty officials who have the necessary skills to deal with complex situations. In the past, the lack of consensus on fundamental issues has damaged Kosovo’s standing and created ill will among its strongest supporters. Given the uncertainties associated with current strategic shifts and the fact that Kosovo is operating from a weaker position, the country's main political forces will need to put aside their narrow political interests, develop a common position on core issues, and chart a clear path forward.
The appointment of a new EU special representative for the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue presents an opportunity for a new beginning. But an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia that would lead to mutual recognition is unlikely in the absence of intensive American diplomatic engagement. The United States has made major investments in Kosovo and should now help Kosovo finally achieve its goals of securing its full sovereignty and achieving a lasting peace with Serbia.
Washington has the credibility and ability to help Kosovo shape its future. A sovereign, stable, prosperous, and democratic Kosovo is in the U.S. national interest. (A2 Televizion)
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